sábado, 19 de dezembro de 2009

Mundo:Is there an Obama doctrine?

By his own admission, Barack Obama received his Nobel peace prize when his accomplishments were still “slight”. But he has big plans—including signing a new nuclear-arms reduction treaty with Russia and, eventually, ridding the world of atomic weapons altogether. When he collected his prize in Oslo on December 10th, he also gave a thought-provoking acceptance speech. To some it hit the rhetorical heights of Cicero (Simon Schama, a historian, in the Financial Times). For others (David Brooks, in the New York Times), there were echoes of Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian with a gloomy view of human nature. The question now obsessing America’s commentariat is whether this speech outlines an “Obama doctrine” in foreign policy. If so, what is it?

Mr Obama has never claimed to be a pacifist. Yet his critics on the right seemed surprised, pleasantly, when he said in Oslo that “there will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Bill Kristol, the neoconservative editor of the Weekly Standard, praised his “hardheaded and pro-American tone”. Sarah Palin appeared to like his observation that “evil does exist in the world”. (She also reminded Americans that they could read her own musings on man’s fallen state in her new book.) John Bolton, on the other hand, remained in a grump. George Bush’s former ambassador to the United Nations took exception to Mr Obama’s acknowledgment that the world would “not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes”. Sometimes Mr Obama is accused of soft-headed idealism (eg, for extending a tentative hand to Iran and North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, to whom he passed a letter last week), and sometimes of a hard-hearted realism that pays too little heed to human rights. When Iran cracked down on pro-democracy protesters in June, he muted his criticism for fear of disrupting the nuclear talks. His administration has made less fuss than some about human rights in China. In Oslo he defended his decision to treat with repressive regimes by arguing that “sanctions without outreach” and “condemnation without discussion” could end in stalemate. On December 14th Hillary Clinton, his secretary of state, took up the refrain. “Our principles are our north star,” she said, “but our tools and tactics must be flexible.”

So is this a distinctive Obama doctrine? Mr Bush’s officials also talked to North Korea and Iran, and By his own admission, Barack Obama received his Nobel peace prize when his accomplishments were still “slight”. But he has big plans—including signing a new nuclear-arms reduction treaty with Russia and, eventually, ridding the world of atomic weapons altogether. When he collected his prize in Oslo on December 10th, he also gave a thought-provoking acceptance speech. To some it hit the rhetorical heights of Cicero (Simon Schama, a historian, in the Financial Times). For others (David Brooks, in the New York Times), there were echoes of Reinhold Niebuhr, a theologian with a gloomy view of human nature. The question now obsessing America’s commentariat is whether this speech outlines an “Obama doctrine” in foreign policy. If so, what is it?

Mr Obama has never claimed to be a pacifist. Yet his critics on the right seemed surprised, pleasantly, when he said in Oslo that “there will be times when nations—acting individually or in concert—will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified.” Bill Kristol, the neoconservative editor of the Weekly Standard, praised his “hardheaded and pro-American tone”. Sarah Palin appeared to like his observation that “evil does exist in the world”. (She also reminded Americans that they could read her own musings on man’s fallen state in her new book.) John Bolton, on the other hand, remained in a grump. George Bush’s former ambassador to the United Nations took exception to Mr Obama’s acknowledgment that the world would “not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes”. Sometimes Mr Obama is accused of soft-headed idealism (eg, for extending a tentative hand to Iran and North Korea’s Kim Jong Il, to whom he passed a letter last week), and sometimes of a hard-hearted realism that pays too little heed to human rights. When Iran cracked down on pro-democracy protesters in June, he muted his criticism for fear of disrupting the nuclear talks. His administration has made less fuss than some about human rights in China. In Oslo he defended his decision to treat with repressive regimes by arguing that “sanctions without outreach” and “condemnation without discussion” could end in stalemate. On December 14th Hillary Clinton, his secretary of state, took up the refrain. “Our principles are our north star,” she said, “but our tools and tactics must be flexible.”So is this a distinctive Obama doctrine? Mr Bush’s officials also talked to North Korea and Iran, and got along well enough with China and Russia. What makes Mr Obama most different so far, argues Peter Beinart of the New America Foundation, a think-tank, is his conviction that an economically stricken America needs to pare down its foreign commitments. When Mr Obama said at West Point at the beginning of December that he was sending 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, he also said that he refused to set goals “that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests”. By definition, a superpower has to sally forth into the world.

economist

Mundo:The accord delivered by the Copenhagen climate talks is hardly far-reaching

The accord offers to enhance long-term co-operative action against climate change, and recognises the need to provide help to poor countries for adaptation. It provides a way to bring together the offers of emission reductions made by various countries before the conference began—and, should they so wish, to raise them—as long as they are confirmed in the next few months, and gives a special status to the idea of holding global warming to no more than 2ºC. It finds words that provide a way forward on the vexed issue of monitoring reductions undertaken by developing countries off their own bat, which is important not least because it is something the American Senate wants reassurance on with respect to China. It offers short-term funding for projects in developing country of $30 billion, and aspires to a long-term system that would, in principle, provide $100 billion a year for mitigation and adaptation from 2020 onwards. And, perhaps the component of clearest value from outside the world of climate politics, it moves forward on REDD, the plan for reducing deforestation.




Nor does the accord provide a solution to the fundamental flaw of the negotiating process; that the Kyoto protocol, the only instrument with which the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) can act on emissions, imposes obligations only on the developed countries that have ratified it. It requires nothing from developing nations, even China, the world's largest emitter of carbon dioxide. And it requires nothing of America.

The UNFCCC's discussions on "long-term co-operative action", which began in Bali two years ago, are meant to produce a new agreement that does tie in America and the other big developing economies, while maintaining the convention’s commitment to "common but differentiated responsibilities". When the accord was announced by heads of government at various different press conferences on Friday, many believed on the basis of earlier drafts circulating that the accord would be accompanied by a mandate requiring by this time next year that the ongoing long-term co-operative action talks deliver the text of a legally binding agreement. The leaders then, for the most part, disappeared into the night, leaving their delegations to sort out the details of where the accord fits into the rest of the negotiations.

The expected mandate for a legally binding treaty vanished at much the same time, and a concerted effort to keep the accord from being adopted by the conference by a small group of countries kept things going all night, very nearly succeeding a few hours before dawn.

Some procedural legerdemain, coupled with the fact that the vast majority of the countries present preferred this accord to no accord, managed to get the text adopted in such a way that it will enter into force